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In  environmental  markets,  parties  frequently  exchange  obligations  through  environmental 
contracts. These contracts imply a distribution of risk between parties. The main focus of our 
paper is to identify contracts that enable risk in environmental markets to be reduced, distributed 
at least cost, or managed efficiently. The risks that we consider are: moral hazard risk, price risk, 
exogenous environmental risk, measurement risk and production risk. The first section of our 
paper  outlines  some  of  the  contracts  currently  utilised  in  financial  and  insurance  markets  to 
achieve  these  objectives.  These are:  futures  and options  contracts,  spread  contracts,  weather 
contracts and catastrophe bonds. We then provide a snapshot of current applications of these 
contracts both in real markets and in the literature. Finally we discuss some possible applications 
in  the  environmental  sector  and  indicate  how  the  use  of  these  contracts  may  alter  the  way 
government manages environmental assets and responsibilities. We also suggest a staged process 
to the introduction of contracts that recognises the current limitations faced by government. This 
paper does not propose new or novel contracts for tackling the problems of risk in exchange. 
Rather it extends the application of existing contractual arrangements to a new type of problem: 
environmental markets. Economic Policy Branch: Working Paper 
Department of Sustainability & Environment, Victoria 
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1  Introduction 
In  recent  years,  policy  makers  have  looked  to  new  mechanisms  such  as  Market 
Based Instruments (MBIs) for tackling environmental problems. At the most basic 
level,  markets  are  institutions  that  facilitate  voluntary  exchange  of  goods  and 
services between buyers and sellers. In the field of environment, MBIs attempt to 
mimic  the  features  of  markets  to  produce  environmental  outcomes  efficiently. 
Environmental outcomes may include biodiversity, habitat for endangered species, 
carbon  sequestration,  improvements  in  river  health,  and  reduction  of  certain 
pollutants  such  as  nitrogen  or  sulphur dioxide.  Transactions  often  occur because 
there  is  a  regulatory  requirement  to  maintain/reduce  the  level  of  pollution  or 
emissions  below  a  certain  level  (i.e.  cap-and-trade  schemes)  or  to  reduce 
environmental impacts (i.e. offset schemes). Examples include the Regional Clean Air 
Incentives Market (RECLAIM, a sulphur oxides and nitrogen oxides cap-and-trade 
scheme) in California, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the US, the 
Emissions  Trading  Scheme  in  the  European  Union  (EU  ETS),  and  the  Victorian 
Government’s  native  vegetation  offset  scheme.  Environmental  transactions  also 
occur  as  the  result  of  government  procurement  programs  such  as  biodiversity 
auctions, grant schemes and other procurement tenders. Examples of these include 
the Victorian Government’s BushTender and ecoTender programs, the New South 
Wales  Hunter  River  Salinity  Trading  Scheme,  and  the  Fitzroy  Basin  Association 
Biodiversity Tender.  
In  environmental  markets,  parties  frequently  transact  by  becoming  parties  to  a 
contract. There are many different types of contracts. While in emissions trading 
schemes market participants buy and sell allowances (that specify the right to emit a 
certain quantity of pollutants within a period of time) or credits (that represents a 
unit  of  reduction  in  the  pollutant  below  a  certain  baseline),  in  other  markets  a 
different  type  of  contract  has  emerged.  Typically,  in  procurement  tenders  like 
BushTender, environmental benefits are purchased via input based contracts. That 
is,  the  environmental  outcome  is  procured  through  a  contract  that  specifies  the 
actions that a landholder commits to undertake for an agreed payment, usually over 
a period of time. With output based contracts, (such as emissions allowances and 
credits), payments are made for delivery of an output. In this type of contract the 
buyer  is  directly  purchasing  the  good  it  is  interested  in  (i.e.  a  unit  of  CO2 
sequestered). Whether environmental benefits are established and purchased via 
input or output based contracts, various types of risks are implicit for buyers and 
sellers in the transaction. 
The main focus of our paper is to identify contracts that enable risk to be reduced, 
reduced,  distributed  at  least-cost,  or  managed  efficiently.  We  also  seek  to 
demonstrate the applicability of various contractual forms in environmental markets. 
The first section of our paper contains a definition and a discussion about the types 
of risks that we have identified in environmental markets. The second section of our 
paper outlines the contracts currently utilised in financial, commodity and insurance 
markets to manage risks inherent in those transactions. These include futures and 
options contracts, spread contracts, weather contracts and catastrophe bonds. We Economic Policy Branch: Working Paper 
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then  provide  a  snapshot  of  current  applications  of  these  contracts  both  in 
established  markets  and  in  the  literature.  We  then  discuss  some  possible 
applications  in  the  environmental  sector  and demonstrate  how  the use  of these 
contracts  may  alter  the  way  government  manages  environmental  assets  and 
responsibilities. The novelty of this paper is to extend the application of existing 
contractual arrangements currently widely used in the financial sector to a new type 
of problem: to help reduce, manage or distribute various types of risks involved in 
transactions in environmental markets.  
 
2  Risk and the role of contracts in environmental markets 
Contracts, whether they are input or output based, can take a myriad of forms. A 
contract is an agreement between parties for the exchange of certain goods or the 
promise of certain actions. A contract is legally binding and sets out the obligations 
of both parties in an agreement. Without contracts, government or other purchasers 
have  no  mechanism  to  secure  either  the  agreed  management  actions  or  the 
environmental  benefits  of  their  investment.  Without  a  contract  the  supplier 
therefore has little incentive to deliver on the agreed terms.  At the same time, 
without contracts landholders do not have any security regarding agreed payments 
for  actions  or  goods  and  services  they  may  produce.  This  leaves  them  exposed. 
Whilst contracts provide some security or certainty to both parties, they are most 
often incomplete. Implicit in these contracts is therefore risk.  
At least five types of risk can be identified in environmental markets: moral hazard 
risk, measurement risk, exogenous environmental risk, price risk and production risk. 
Moral hazard risk refers to the risk that the producer will apply little effort when 
fulfilling their contractual obligations. Measurement risk is the risk that the scientific 
tools and human error involved in the assessment of environmental outcomes may 
be subject to error. Exogenous environmental risk refers to the risk that an event 
beyond  the  control  of  parties  to  the  contract  will  result  in  a  reduction  of 
environmental outcomes (for example because a fire or a drought wipes out the 
environmental gains that have been made by a landholder). Price risk is the risk 
associated  with  changes  in  the  market  price  over  time  (where  both  buyers  and 
sellers are price takers). Production risk is the risk that actions or inputs will not 
produce  the  desired  environmental  gains.  Depending  on  how  the  contract  is 
structured, the parties to the contract will share these risks amongst themselves or 
will use some form of insurance to transfer this risk to a third-party outside of the 
contract.
1 
Risk is important because it imposes costs on the parties who bear it. For example, 
input  based  contracts  typically  create  risks  for  the  buyer  in  the  event  of  some 
external interruption to the contract (exogenous environmental risk) or if the inputs 
                                                 
1 Although not considered here, a range of mixed contracts with payments for inputs and outputs (for 
example using performance  bonuses) can also be designed using the techniques of  contract and 
incentive theory. Bardsley et al (2009) for example have shown that the optimal contract design will 
differ in regulatory and procurement environments.  Economic Policy Branch: Working Paper 
Department of Sustainability & Environment, Victoria 
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specified in the contract do not achieve the outcome (production risk). Transactions 
in output based contracts closely resemble other well-developed markets: in these 
contracts  sellers  receive  payments  for  their  actual  production  levels,  there  is  no 
moral hazard risk, and the exogenous environmental risk and the production risk are 
borne by producers (sellers). Contracts also have an important time dimension to 
them. Which party bears the price risk depends on the timing and conditions of the 
transaction. This risk is important both for producers of environmental outcomes 
(who may be making forward production decisions) and for buyers of environmental 
outcomes  (who  may  wish  to  ensure  that  a  certain  quantity  of  environmental 
outcomes can be purchased from a given budget). 
Unfortunately it is impossible or costly to eliminate all risks. Eliminating or reducing 
production  risk  for  example  requires  improved  scientific  understanding  of  the 
production of environmental outcomes or experience through time. As knowledge of 
the production function is expected to improve over time and with research and 
experience, it is possible that distribution of this type of risk will also change over 
time. That is, the production risk may initially be better placed with those who have 
knowledge  through  research  but  may  be  better  transferred  to  those  who  build 
experience over time.  Similarly, measurement risk is also expected to decrease with 
better measurement tools and by building capacity in the environmental sector to 
carry out accurate measurements.  
Prices and the environmental outcomes that result from these markets will reflect 
the way the risk is shared between buyers and sellers. The distribution of risk implicit 
in  contracts  will  therefore  have  important  implications  for  the  functioning  of 
environmental markets. The next section of this paper briefly outlines a range of 
contracts  used  in  the  financial,  commodity,  and  insurance  sector  that  have 
developed to reduce, distribute or manage various risks in the exchange of different 
goods and services. We then go on to discuss how these contracts might be used in 
environmental markets and finally we discuss how establishing these contracts may 
also change the role of government in managing environmental assets. 
 
3  Contracts used to manage risk in exchange 
Various contracts have developed in financial and commodity markets to reduce 
distribute or manage the risks inherent in the sale of various goods and services. In 
this section we describe some of these contracts and give examples of how they are 
applied currently.  
3.1  Futures Contracts 
A futures contract allows people to buy and sell assets at a pre-determined price for 
delivery on a specific future date. This differs to buying and selling assets in the spot 
market, where the assets are traded instantly at current prices and physical delivery 
of the asset takes place immediately. By locking in a price today, futures contracts Economic Policy Branch: Working Paper 
Department of Sustainability & Environment, Victoria 
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allow market participants to make investment decisions based on price certainty, 
without being exposed to future price changes.
2  
Specifications: 
In order to formulate a futures contract, the following parameters have to be specified: 
1)  a unit of an asset  (e.g. a bushel of wheat) 
2)  price (paid for the unit of asset at expiry) 
3)  expiration date (e.g. May 2012) 
 
Example: 
A wheat farmer is concerned the price of wheat may fall in the coming months. Prior to entering into 
wheat production, the farmer calculates that in order to make a profit, he needs to sell the wheat for 
at least $8.5 a bushel. He decides to enter into a futures contract to ensure he is protected in the 
event of a dramatic fall in the price of wheat. The current (August 2012) spot price is $10 a bushel, 
whilst the futures price in December 2012 is $9 a bushel. Satisfied with such a price, the farmer enters 
into a contract to sell 10 000 bushels at $9 for December 2012 expiry.    
 
3.2  Options Contracts 
Another example of a contract is an option. An option gives its owner the right, but 
not the obligation, to buy or sell an asset at a pre-agreed price.  This is thus more 
flexible than a futures contract, which obliges the contract holder to buy or sell an 
asset. 
There are two main types of options. When exercised, a call option gives the holder 
the right, but not the obligation, to buy an asset at a certain price. Similarly, when 
exercised, a put option gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to sell an 
underlying asset at a certain price. The purchaser of an option has to pay an initial 
sum of money, called the premium, to the seller of the contract. There are two main 
option styles: European style options, which can be exercised only on the date of 
expiry, and American style options, which can be exercised on or before the date of 
expiry.   
 
Specifications 
In order to formulate an option contract, the following parameters have to be specified: 
1)  unit of an asset (e.g. a ton of steel) 
2)  contract type: put or call 
3)  contract style: European or American 
4)  agreed price (price paid for the unit of asset if exercised) 
5)  premium (cost of the contract itself) 
6)  expiration date (e.g. May 2012) 
 
                                                 
2 Futures contracts are traded on a centralised futures exchange. A futures contract is similar to a 
forward contract however a forward contract is a non-standardised private agreement between two 
parties and is not exchange traded.  Economic Policy Branch: Working Paper 
Department of Sustainability & Environment, Victoria 
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Example: 
A company is currently (August 2012) deciding whether to expand its operations, with a decision to be 
made by the end of 2012. If the expansion goes ahead, the company will need to purchase 1,000 
tonnes of steel. The company is concerned about rapidly increasing steel prices but does not want to 
lock itself into buying the steel unless it is sure the expansion will go ahead. 
The company therefore decides to purchase an American style call option to buy steel anytime before 
the contract expires in December 2012. The company pays a premium of $20 for each of the 1,000 
Dec 2010 call option contracts that gives the company the right to buy a ton of steel at a price of $550 
per ton. 
As this is an American option, the company has the right to exercise the option (i.e. purchase the 
steel) at any time until the contract’s expiry in December 2012 at the price of $550 per ton. It may 
decide not to do this if the expansion does not proceed. Even if the expansion does proceed but the 
price of steel falls below $550 per ton, the company can choose to buy the steel at the spot market 
rather than exercising the option.  
In December, the company decides to expand its operations. The December spot price for steel ended 
up being $650 per ton. As this is greater than the $550 price specified in the contract, the company 
decides to exercise the option and purchase the steel.  
 
3.3  Spread Contracts 
A spread contract is an agreement between two parties to exchange payments if an 
index is outside a pre-specified range at the time of expiration. A seller of a spread 
contract quotes the  purchaser  a  ‘spread’  (i.e. a  range  of the  index).  This  spread 
represents the values of the index where no money will be exchanged between the 
parties.  The  contract  specifies  which  party  (buyer  or  seller)  pays  or  receives  a 
payment if the index is outside the pre-specified spread during the contract period. 
The contract also specifies the amount to be exchanged between the parties for 
each point of movement above or below the spread. Each party stands to profit if 
the indicator moves beyond the spread in the direction that favours them, and to 
pay if the indicator moves in the other direction. This contract ignores movements in 
the market that are within the pre-specified range and changes in the index only 
become  important  if  the  movement  is  above  or  below  the  spread.  A  greater 




In order to formulate a spread contract, the following parameters have to be specified: 
1)  index (e.g. FTSE 100, ASX 200) 
2)  direction (e.g. increase or decrease)  
3)  spread (a range of the index, e.g. between 3995 and 4005 points) 
4)  the amount of money paid or received per point 
5)  expiration date (e.g. May 2012) 
 
An  investor  believes  the  Dow  Jones  Industrial  Average  will  suffer  heavy  losses  during  the  day’s 
trading. She decides to ask a spread contract agency for a quote on the Dow Jones’s movements for 
the day. She is offered a spread of between 9995 and 10005 points. She decides on a tick of $10 per Economic Policy Branch: Working Paper 
Department of Sustainability & Environment, Victoria 
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point and will stand to gain money if the Dow Jones falls below 9995, and lose money if it goes above 
10005.  
At the end of the day’s trading, the Dow Jones has indeed fallen to 9850. The investor therefore 
receives $10 for every point it fell below 9995. As the index ended the day 145 points below the 
spread, the investor receives 10 x 145 = $1450.  
 
3.4  Weather Contracts 
A range of contracts have been developed to address other kinds of risk. One such 
non-standard  contract  (often  referred  to  as  an  ‘exotic’  contract)  is  a  weather 
derivative.  These  contracts  were  developed  to  enable  parties  to  manage  and 
mitigate the threats posed by exogenous environment risks such as adverse weather 
events. A weather derivative consists of a contract between two parties that details 
how  payment  will  be  exchanged  depending  on  certain  meteorological  conditions 
(e.g.  temperature,  precipitation,  snowfall  and  wind-speed)  during  the  contract 
period. Like spread contracts, weather derivatives have special attributes that set 
them apart from other commodity derivatives. The main conceptual difference is 
that  these  derivatives  do  not  trade  an  underlying  asset:  one  is  not  purchasing 
weather.  Rather,  participants  exchange  payments  based  on  a  state  of  the  world 
described explicitly in the contract. In this sense this contract is a substitute to an 
insurance product. One of the advantages of weather derivatives is that they cannot 
be manipulated by individuals. Hence these types of contracts do not suffer from the 
same moral hazard problems as other risk management products such as insurance. 
As with any other transaction, a person willing to sign a weather contract requires a 
counter-party. This counter-party either has an inverse upside (i.e. they gain when 
you lose and vice versa) or they are better able to spread their exposure to risk (e.g. 
they can sign contracts across areas that have inversely correlated risks). 
 
Specifications 
In order to formulate a weather derivative contract, the following parameters have to be specified: 
1)  weather index (e.g. mm of snow, km/h speed of wind, mm of rain, C degrees in temperature) 
2)  the threshold where payments begin 
3)  the amount of money paid or received per point if the index is above/below the threshold (e.g. 
$250 per degree above 30 degrees) 
4)  premium (the cost of the contract itself) 
5)  expiry date (e.g. August 2012) 
 
Example: 
A winemaker is concerned that long range forecasts of snowy weather may damage his vineyards. He 
decides to purchase a weather derivative contract to manage this risk. 
The farmer pays a premium of $5000 to purchase the weather derivative. On each day till the expiry 
of the contract (August 2012), the winemaker receives $100 for each cm of snow above a threshold of 
5cm.  
 Economic Policy Branch: Working Paper 
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3.5  Catastrophe bonds 
Catastrophe bonds (also known as CAT bonds) are contracts that transfer a specific 
risk from the seller (e.g. government or insurance company) to the buyer. The buyer 
accepts the risk in return for interest payments. If no catastrophic event occurs, the 
seller pays interest to the bond holder (e.g. the current interbank lending rate plus a 
premium). If, at any time prior to the expiry of the bond, specified trigger conditions 
are  met  (e.g.  a  hurricane,  earthquake  or  other  catastrophic  event),  the  principal 
initially paid by the buyers would be foregone, and instead used by the seller to pay 
claims  to  policyholders.  Catastrophe  bonds  are  typically  used  by  insurers  as  an 
alternative to traditional catastrophe reinsurance.
3    
 
Specifications 
In order to formulate a CAT bond, the following parameters have to be specified: 
1)  principal (e.g. $1000) 
2)  interest rate (e.g. 15%) 
3)  catastrophe type (e.g. earthquake, flood, volcanic eruption) 
4)  index (to measure the degree of catastrophic event) 
5)  trigger condition that if met, the premium is kept by the seller of the bond 




Example: An insurer is concerned about its exposure to earthquake risk in the Sydney area. It decides 
to issue a CAT bond to investors. The principal payment is $1000. The bond has an interest rate of 
10% per annum, an expiration date of December 2015 and a trigger condition of any earthquake in 
the Sydney metropolitan area that measures above 5.5 on the Richter scale. In the event of no such 
earthquake occurring, investors would receive 10% of the principal each year (ie. 0.1 x 1000 = $100 
per year) as well as the principal on expiration. If an earthquake of sufficient magnitude were to occur 
during the time period, the insurer would keep the principal and use it to pay claims to policy holders.  
4  Discussion 
In this section we demonstrate the way in which contracts described in the previous 
section  may  be  used  to  reduce,  manage  or  distribute  risks  amongst  market 
participants. We then provide a brief overview of some of the current and proposed 
applications of these contracts in areas related to environmental policy. Finally we 
describe how these contracts may be used to facilitate the participation of buyers 
and  sellers  in  environmental  markets  and  also  to  potentially  redefine  the 
government’s role in managing environmental assets over time. 
 
                                                 
3 One of the advantages of a CAT bonds for investors is that CATs show no direct correlation with 
equities or corporate bonds, meaning they provide a good diversification of risks. Economic Policy Branch: Working Paper 
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4.1  Reducing, managing and distributing risks 
All contracts discussed in this paper are based on outputs. One of the advantages of 
such  contracts  is  that  they  eliminate  moral  hazard  risk.  Output  based  contracts 
however rely on effective measurement of the good or service in question. Over 
time,  measurement  and  quality  rating  systems  have  evolved  to  allow  relatively 
homogenous goods and services to be measured, grouped and traded with ease. For 
example, an ounce of 24 carat gold is such that it allows buyers and sellers to enter 
into contracts with each other knowing exactly what they trade.  
In order to facilitate transactions in environmental markets, scientists have in recent 
years designed a range of Environmental Benefit (EB) metrics in the form of indices 
and  units  to  measure,  model  or  score  the  relative  quantity  and  quality  of 
environmental benefits or their indicators. For example, a biodiversity index may 
score the relative diversity of species present in an area
4; a salinity index may score a 
unit change in salinity based on modelled outcomes; a river health index may model 
changes  in  aquatic  functions.
5  These  indices  increasingly  allow  contracts  to  be 
directly related to an environmental outcome. They enable the current condition of 
outcomes to be measured or scored and may also model or predict changes (either 
gains  or  losses).  However  these  tools  also  suffer  from  measurement  risk.  The 
inherent risk in measuring the environmental outcome will have implications for the 
contract and for parties’ willingness to transact. Measurement risk can be greatly 
reduced over time through increased collection of information, the use of multiple 
measurement  systems,  improved  technology,  piloting  and  refining  measurement 
tools and well-trained field officers.  
In addition to accurate systems of output measurement, output contracts will be 
more successful if there is greater knowledge of the production function associated 
with the environmental good or service. The existence of significant production risk is 
one  of  the  primary  reasons  for  the  use  of  input  based  contracts  in  infant 
environmental  markets.  Input  based  contracts  distribute  production  risks  to  the 
buyer,  who  is  most  often  the  government  in  these  markets.  As  these  markets 
mature, the balance of production knowledge shifts from government to producer, 
who can gain experience through ‘learning by doing’. Hence it may be appropriate to 
consider  shifting  some  of  the  production  risk  to  producers.  If  production  risk 
continues to be borne by purchasers of environmental goods and services, producers 
have  no  incentive  to  invest  in  trialling  new  and  better  production  methods  or 
research and development.  
                                                 
4  For  example,  the  habitat  hectare  (HHa)  is  a  widely  used  metric  to  score  habitat  (a  proxy  for 
biodiversity) in Victoria. It consists of a measure of the quality and the area of a vegetation type. The 
BushTender, ecoTender, and the native vegetation offset program all use HHa to measure the losses 
and gains in environmental outcomes.  
5  In  general,  environmental  outcomes  may  be  measured  on  a  continuous  or  discrete  scale.  For 
example,  water  or  air  quality  may  be  measured  on  a  continuous  scale.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
threatened species is either present or not. For a literature review on the various aspects to be 
considered in designing appropriate environmental indices to support environmental outcomes, see 
Collins & Scoccimarro, 2008. Economic Policy Branch: Working Paper 
Department of Sustainability & Environment, Victoria 
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Option contracts can help manage production risk. Put options give the right but not 
the  obligation  to  sell  at  a  pre-specified  price  within  a  period  of  time.  If  the 
production function was poorly estimated and the output was lower than expected 
or did not eventuate, the put option holder can simply decide not to exercise it. In 
exchange for a premium, the put option holder can create a safe ‘trial’ environment 
where  their  effort  (if  successful)  could  be  rewarded  by  a  pre-specified  price. 
Otherwise, no further payment (other than the initial premium) takes place. 
A spread contract can also create a safety zone where no payments are made unless 
the index moves out of this range. In this instance, measurement and production risk 
are distributed between buyers and sellers. This sharing is represented and priced by 
the spread. Payments are only made if the movement in the environmental outcome 
is  either  positive  or  negative  but  ‘large  enough’  that  it  cannot  be  attributed  to 
measurement error or some mistakes in the production estimates alone. Whilst risks 
such as measurement risks and productions risks can be greatly reduced over time, it 
is unlikely they will ever be completely eliminated. 
The  contracts  described  in  the  pervious  section  are  frequently  used  to  support 
markets  that  trade  a  range  of  goods  and  services.  In  agricultural  production  for 
example, producers commonly manage price risk through futures contracts. Futures 
contracts specify the price to be paid and the delivery date in a future time period. 
These contracts are essential for the exchange of goods and services where delivery 
is  at  some  future  date.  They  provide  future  price  certainty  and  hence  facilitate 
decision-making  in  the  present.  Spread  contracts  eliminate  price  risks  for  both 
buyers and sellers because the amount of money paid or received per point is pre-
determined at the point of entering into the contract. 
In the same way a farmer might enter into a futures contract for wheat, she can 
enter into a futures contract to produce environmental outcomes. For example, a 
farmer may estimate that she can produce 2 units of Habitat Hectare (HHa) by June 
2015. The farmer estimates the cost of her effort over a period of time and decides it 
is only worth entering the biodiversity market if she can secure a price of at least 
$1200 per HHa produced. The farmer turns to the futures market to find a party who 
is willing to pay at least $1200 per HHa with an expiry date of June 2015 or later. If 
the farmer finds a suitable contractual partner, then through the futures contract 
she locks in the price ($1200 or higher), the expiry date (June 2015 or later) and the 
units of HHa to be delivered (up to 2HHa). Until a suitable contractual party is found, 
there is no obligation on the farmer to produce HHa. The futures contract allows the 
farmer to manage price risk by specifying the sales price prior to any investment 
decisions. 
Options contracts also manage price risks but they also offer some added flexibility 
by allowing the holder to make a decision whether or not to exercise the contract 
(i.e.  to  buy  or  sell  at  the  pre-specified  price).  Continuing  on  from  the  previous 
example, instead of a futures contract, the same landholder could purchase a put 
option (for a premium of $100) which gives her the right (but not the obligation) to 
sell 2HHas at a price of $1200 or higher. Once the HHa is produced prior to contract Economic Policy Branch: Working Paper 
Department of Sustainability & Environment, Victoria 
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expiry, the landholder can exercise the put option and be entitled to the agreed 
price.
6  
Suppliers of environmental outcomes also face a range of uncertainties that impact 
upon their ability to produce. Climatic variability, droughts, flood events, fire, hail, 
and other  extreme  weather  conditions  are only  some  of the  examples  that may 
affect production. Unlike measurement risk, production risk and moral hazard risk, 
these exogenous environmental risks cannot be reduced or eliminated but can only 
be managed or distributed. Put option contracts can also help manage exogenous 
environmental risk. If the above mentioned landholder fails to produce the 2 HHa 
within the specified contractual timeframe due to unforeseen climatic variability, she 
loses the premium ($100) but there are no further consequences and no further 
payment  takes  place.  Historically,  the  agricultural  sector  has  addressed  the 
exogenous environmental risks through the use of insurance products, such as crop 
insurance. However weather derivatives (on a small scale) and CAT bonds (on larger 
scales) are well placed to help manage and distribute these risks. These products 
have some distinct advantages over insurance products that seek to assist producers 
to manage the same risk. Firstly, they are not subject to moral hazard risk; secondly, 
if participants are able to find a party with the exact inverse of their risk profile then 
they may be able to hedge their risk without the cost of a premium.  
 
4.2  Current and proposed applications 
Futures and options contracts are used in everyday transactions in the electricity 
market, mainly to mitigate price risks. Electricity use is highly dependent on weather 
and weather contracts are now a common tool for electricity retailers to protect 
against exogenous environmental risks such as the consequences of abnormally high 
or low temperatures.
7 CAT bonds have also been introduced in the US and Australia 
for very low probability but extremely costly events (e.g. earthquakes).  
Options contracts have also been nominated (though not adopted) as a means for 
water utilities to ensure secure water supply for urban water users (see for example 
Michelsen & Young, 1993 and Hansen et al, 2008). With a call option, a water utility 
could secure water allocations from rural water license holders if and when needed. 
Under  this  scenario,  the  water  utility  has  the  right,  but  not  the  obligation,  to 
                                                 
6 If at the time the landholder considers exercising the put option the spot price of the HHa is higher 
then the pre-specified price, the landholder may decide to sell the HHa at the market directly. The put 
option gives insurance to a minimum payment but does not prevent the farmer taking advantage of a 
higher spot price. 
7 Initially, there were a small number of locations where weather was measured for the purpose of 
derivatives. As weather derivatives became more common, the measurement stations have become 
more frequent and the product has become geographically more differentiated and therefore better 
at addressing local risk conditions. Dutton (2002) documents that timescales of weather derivatives 
are expanding towards both the shorter term (fractions of an hour for weather-induced electricity 
demand)  and  longer  term  (monthly  or  seasonal  scales  to  manage  weather  risks  in  agricultural 
production). For climate change related risks, for example, contracts based on longer time horizons 
(5-10 years) may be more appropriate.  Economic Policy Branch: Working Paper 
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purchase the water. Similarly, Hafi et al (2005) suggested that an environmental 
manager could also exercise call options to secure water to deal with the risk posed 
by  an  exogenous  environmental  risk  such  as  drought,  e.g.  buy  back  rural  water 
allocations for environmental flows. The above-mentioned examples represent an 
alternative risk management strategy to the traditional and costly approaches of 
building  greater  and  greater  infrastructure  or  introducing  command-and-control 
style water restrictions to manage availability of water or the effects of drought. 
Gorddard et al (2008) reports on an auction for the conservation of three threatened 
ground nesting bird species in the Murray Catchment: Bush Stone Curlew, Plains 
Wanderer and Brolga.  The auction, called NestEgg, required landholders to choose 
between an input based contract and an output based contract. Landholders bid by 
specifying the upfront payment (i.e. the premium) they require in order to enter into 
the  contract.  The  output  contracts  pay  an  annual  bonus  to  landholder  when  a 
‘habitat  benchmark’  and/or  a  ‘bird  species  benchmark’  is  achieved.  Input  based 
contracts pay an annual management payment for undertaking certain conservation 
actions.  The  tender  results  indicated  that  all  landholders  chose  output  based 
contracts. 
Mandel et al (2009) suggest applying the CAT bond approach to endangered species 
conservation to address exogenous environmental risks. If the species or the species’ 
habitat declines to a predetermined threshold, the principal the buyers paid would 
become available for species/habitat recovery initiatives. Similar to other uses of CAT 
bonds,  this  instrument  creates  an  immediately  available  fund  to  address  species 
recovery. A CAT bond requires the monitoring of the species need to be based on an 
objective measure. It is also possible for such a contract to align private incentives 
with the interests of endangered species. 
There are also cases where these types of contracts are used in novel ways by firms. 
Zeng (2000) for example, documents a case where a snow blower retailer offered its 
customers a payment if the total snowfall for the coming winter was less than a 
threshold. This innovative sales technique can be looked at as if the retailer provided 
a  weather  contract  with  each  sale.  This  weather  contract  assists  customers  in 
managing the probability of high and low snowfall and partially compensates them 
for the investment in a snow blower in case the snowfall turned out to be low. It is 
assumed the retailer included a premium in the price of the snow blower for offering 
the payment.  
Spread contracts have developed, primarily for use in financial markets, to manage 
risks of a stock portfolio but until today, spread contracts have not been utilized in 
the environmental context.  
 
4.3  Government as environmental manager 
Government  currently  plays  a  crucial  role  in  managing  environmental  assets,  in 
procuring  environmental  goods  and  services  from  landholders,  and  in  imposing 
obligations on private parties to ameliorate environmental damages. It has many 
tools  at  its  disposal  to  achieve  outcomes  and  manage  risks.  We  argue  that  the Economic Policy Branch: Working Paper 
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contracts described  in this  paper  could  become  a  valuable part  of  government’s 
policy tool kit. Because of its pervasive role in environmental markets, we also argue 
that  government  has  a  role  in  facilitating  the  use  of  these  contracts  by  private 
parties. By continuing to adopt input based contracts, governments may crowd out 
private  risk  management  providers  from  the  market  such  as  weather  contract 
providers.  If  participants  can  reduce,  distribute  and  manage  the  risk  they  face, 
output  based  contracts  have  the  potential  to  improve  the  efficiency  of 
environmental production, and to achieve greater environmental outcomes at lower 
cost.  We  also  acknowledge  that  it  is  not  feasible  for  such  contracts  to  become 
standard  practice  immediately.  Rather,  we  suggest  a  gradual  but  deliberate 
approach  to  their  use.  We  characterise  this  gradual  approach  in  the  four  steps 
below.  We  then  go  on  to  elaborate  on  how  government  may  recast  the  way  it 
undertakes environmental management.   
Step 1: reduce measurement risk and production risk.  
The reduction of these risks to a tolerable level (i.e. where the marginal cost of reducing the risk is 
equal to the marginal benefits of reducing it) is crucial to the adoption of output based contracts. 
Output  based  contracts  are  themselves  a  pre-requisite  for  a  large  proportion  of  the  contracts 
discussed in paper. 
Step 2: adopt flexible contract forms. 
Contracts that allow for some tolerance of measurement and production risk (such as options and 
spreads) become feasible once measurement and production risk have been reduced. A premium is 
paid for a more certain environmental result; encouraging producers to bear and manage risk.  
Step 3: widespread use of output based contracts alongside other contract forms.  
Output based contracts become standard practice in environmental markets. Parties to transactions 
utilise a range of contract forms to manage their risks. 
Step 4: recast the role of government as a manager of environmental outcomes. 
Government recasts the role of an environmental manager to enable the use of a range of contracts 
to achieve efficient outcomes and in response to changing circumstances.  
In Section 4.1 we concentrated on the applications of contracts currently used in 
financial markets by producers of environmental goods and services. We now turn to 
the implications of these contracts for how government might eventually discharge 
its environmental responsibilities.  
How government might use these contracts is likely to differ from how landholders 
might  use  them.  Government  has  different  objectives  and  may  be  affected 
differently by risk. For example government may be better able to aggregate and 
spread localised exogenous environmental risks than individual landholders. At the 
same time, whilst put options allow flexibility for landholders, these contracts do not 
guarantee that specific environmental objectives are achieved (e.g. that a threshold 
level of EB is achieved or the overall environmental quality is maintained across a 
region). Futures contracts offer more certainty to the government as the landholder 
is obliged to deliver the environmental outcome by the contract expiry date. This 
means the landholder may have to enter the market as a buyer in order to ‘make 
good’  the  environmental  contract.  This  also  relies  on  government  enforcing  its 
contracts with landholders. If it is in any way reluctant to do so the benefits of these Economic Policy Branch: Working Paper 
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contracts decline. An independent authority tasked with achieving outcomes may be 
better placed than government to make use of contracts that require enforcement.    
There  are  various  exogenous  events  (e.g.  bushfires)  that  may  require  the 
government to speedily recover losses. In order to have a stock of environmental 
outcomes on ‘stand-by’, the government may enter into a call option contract with 
landholders  for  the  delivery  of  environmental  outcomes.  This  type  of  contract 
requires the government to pay a premium to the landholder to be prepared to sell 
environmental outcomes when required but gives government flexibility in making 
the decision to call upon them.  
For example, the government may be concerned with the biodiversity loss resulting 
from a bushfire but equally concerned with the consequences of a possible drought 
on aquatic functions. The probability of occurrence of either a fire or a drought (or 
both) is not known with certainty. In order to prepare for the possible events, the 
government may decide to pay a premium to a landholder for biodiversity options 
and to pay a premium to another landholder who, if and when needed, can supply 
aquatic outcomes.  If a bushfire occurs, the government exercises the biodiversity 
call option (i.e. purchases the biodiversity outcomes at the pre-agreed price). If on 
the other hand, drought occurs, the government exercises the aquatic call option 
(i.e. purchases the aquatic outcomes at a pre-agreed price). If neither of these events 
occurs the only loss to the government is the premium paid to landholders to be on 
“stand by”. Both buyers and sellers know with certainty the price that is paid for the 
environmental outcomes delivered.  
With this approach, both the landholder and the government have eliminated price 
risk and the government has an effective management tool to respond to exogenous 
environmental risks (i.e. only exercises the call option if the state of the environment 
changes such as a bushfire or drought). Hence these contracts are an effective risk 
management tool for government and could therefore become an integral part of its 
toolkit. The flexibility of these contracts is likely to become increasingly important as 
government  faces  the  unknown  but  highly  variable  impacts  of  changes  in  the 
climate.  
Environmental responsibilities that are currently informal could also be made formal 
with the use of environmental contracts. For example, landholders currently have 
‘duty of care’ obligations (i.e. a minimum level of environmental management) that 
specify minimum standards of land management. There is, however, no incentive for 
landholders to improve environmental quality above this minimum.  
Spread  contracts  could  prove  useful  for  the  government  to  provide  additional 
incentives to avoid deterioration in environmental outcomes whilst also providing 
positive incentives to improve quality. The government may decide on a ‘spread’ of 
the environmental outcome and the amount that is to be paid or received if the 
index  measuring  the  outcome  is  to  move  out  of  the  spread’s  upper  or  lower 
threshold. If the index increases beyond the pre-determined threshold by the end of 
the contract period, the landholder would receive payments from the government. 
If, however, the index falls below a predetermined threshold, the government would 
receive payments from the landholder. The upper threshold would represent the Economic Policy Branch: Working Paper 
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minimum  environmental  improvement  that  can  be  attributed  with  certainty  to 
improvements and is well beyond measurement uncertainty. The lower threshold 
can be thought of as the minimum level of ‘duty of care’.  
This contract can easily be compared to a government policy that imposes a penalty 
on  landholders  for  not  meeting  their  ‘duty  of  care’  or  minimum  regulatory 
obligations and rewards landholders who exceed them. In this case the penalty is not 
fixed but is dependent upon the severity of the loss (penalty is paid per unit of loss) 
just as any payments the landholder receives for gains also depend on the extent of 
improvement. The contract could be constructed so that the per-unit payment is 
different depending on whether a biodiversity gain or loss occurs. 
Spread contracts would allow governments to better tailor incentives to suit specific 
situations, depending on whether their priority is to encourage improvements or 
avoid  degradation.  The  contract  also  allows  for  some  natural  variability  in  the 
environment to be incorporated by setting the lower threshold of the spread at a 
value that tolerates it. Another advantage of this type of contract is that no up-front 
premium need be paid by either party in the transaction.  
The concept of a catastrophe bond could also be applied to assist managers of high 
value  natural  assets  to  deal  with  exogenous  environmental  risk.  Consider  the 
manager of a National Park who faces heavy costs to rehabilitate a popular tourist 
destination  after  a  natural  event  such  as  a  cyclone,  fire,  flood  or  storm.  A 
catastrophe bond would provide this National Park manager (or their insurer) access 
to funds to assist in the rehabilitation of the Park in the same way they provide 
insurance companies access to capital to fund their liabilities. These contracts could 
also play a significant role in managing climate generated exogenous environmental 
risk as climate change is expected to increase the frequency and severity of extreme 
weather events. 
5  Conclusions 
Improvements in science increasingly allow us to measure and predict aquatic and 
atmospheric  pollution  levels,  biodiversity,  and  other  environmental  outcomes  of 
interest and to understand their importance for a healthy and productive society. At 
the same time new types of contracts are required to facilitate the emergence of 
market-based approaches to these problems such as emissions trading and offset 
schemes. Such contracts are a crucial part of a well-functioning market. They enable 
participants to effectively reduce, distribute and manage a variety of risks inherent in 
the  production  and  exchange  of  all  goods  and  services,  including  those  in 
environmental markets.   
This paper has considered the role that futures, options, spread contracts, weather 
contracts and catastrophe bonds can play in the development of more sophisticated 
and  efficient  environmental  markets.  It  has  given  a  snapshot  of  some  relevant 
existing applications and posited some uses in reducing, distributing and managing 
several types of risk in environmental markets. Specifically, this paper has discussed 
measurement  risk,  production  risk,  moral  hazard  risk,  price  risk  and  exogenous 
environmental risk in environmental markets. Economic Policy Branch: Working Paper 
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In  the  foreseeable  future,  government  will  continue  to  play  a  significant  role  in 
environmental markets. The above-mentioned environmental contracts may enable 
government to undertake its role with greater flexibility and precision and at a lower 
cost.  Unlike  in  regular  markets,  where  new  types  of  contracts  emerge  through 
private innovation, in the environmental sector government may need to take, at 
least  in  the  short  term,  a  lead  in  facilitating  the  development  and  providing  a 
regulatory  framework  for  these  new  types  of  contracts.  Access  to  a  range  of 
products  that  enable  producers  to  manage  their  risks  should  reduce  costs  of 
participation. This may increase the viability of environmental production for private 
firms and in doing so deepen existing markets for environmental services. This may 
be  a  necessary  condition  for  producers  to  see  production  in  the  environmental 
sector as a viable alternative to more traditional markets.  
This  paper  advocates  a  staged  approach  to  the  introduction  of  the  contracts 
described in previous sections. As a first step, we stress that addressing production 
and measurement risk is important. Second, flexible contracts such as options and 
spreads can be explored and trialled. Third, output based contracts can be trialled 
alongside  mechanisms  such  as  weather  derivatives  and  CAT  bonds.  Once  these 
contracts  have  become  standard  practice,  government  can  recast  the  role  of  an 
environmental  manager  to  achieve  outcomes  efficiently  in  response  to  changing 
circumstances. Economic Policy Branch: Working Paper 
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